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Preface
The Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews was
created by the Notional Research Council in June 1981 as a result of a
request by the Congress of the United States to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration that i4: establish an ongoing
relationship with the National Academy cf Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering for the purpose of providing an independent,
objective review of the scientific and technological merits of NASA
program changes whenever the Congressional Committees on
Appropriations so direct.l
When a review is requested, the Committee is called into action to
set the terms of reference, select a panel of experts to carry out the
task, and review the resulting report before publication.
The panel undertook its first task during the summer months of
1981 when it reviewed alternative versions of the International Solar
Polar Mission, a joint venture between NASA and the European Space
Agency. A report was issued and the results of the review were
presented in briefings to Congress and to NASA in the early part of
September 1981.2
The second task, which is the subject of this report, resulted
from a request by the Congressional Committees on Appropriations to
the NASA Administrator (Appendix A) in March 1982 for a review of
reductions in NASA's Aeronautics Research and Technology Program. The
Committee met on March 27, 1982, to establish terms of reference
(Appendix C) for the review based on the congressional request and to
nominate a panel combining various areas of industrial, academic,
economic, and governmental expertise to undertake the task. In
appointing such a group of individuals to make scientific and
technical assessments, it is essential that the majority have a high
degree of expertise in the subject of the study. IL is an almost
lCongressional Conference Report 96-1476, November 21, 1980.
2The International Solar Polar Mission: A Review and Assessment of
Options, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., September 1981.
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impossible task to find individuals totally without potential bias who
have the appropriate qualifications. Thus, every effort was made to
achieve a balance in backgrounds and attitudes of the panelists in
order to present as objective a report as possible.
The short period of time over which the review had to be
undertaken put severe demands on the Chairman and members of the
panel, who deserve much credit for their effective and timely response.
Norman Hackerman
Chairman, Committee on NASA Scientific
and Technological Program Reviews
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Executive Summary
The Committee on NASA Program Reviews of the National Research Council
in response to requests from the Congressional Committees on
Appropriations formed the Review Panel for Reductions in the FY 1983
NASA Aeronautics Research and Technology Program and provided
guidelines for the review on March 27, 1982. The congressional
request was for review of reductions in the Fiscal Year 1983 program
from the original NASA proposal to the levels of the appropriation
request submitted to Congress. The request asked for an assessment of
the national criticality of the excluded programs arid, for each one,
the risk (probability of success) assoc.__;_c wit.i achieving the
objectives sought and tht degree to which it might be assumed by the
private sector.
Based on this request, the NRC Committee on NASA Program Reviews
developed a charge comprising an assessment of those aeronautics
projects excluded from the NASA FY 1983 budget request to Congress,
the likelihood that industry would undertake them, the impact of their
not being done, and the more genertil question of the need for
government to "bridge the gap" betwcRn the Aeronautic$ Research and
Technology (RiT) Base and early application- 1 The charge further
specifies that the assessment is to encompass consideratic-nr, of
safety, national defense, efficient transport, and the national
economy.
NATIONAL CRITICALITY AND BRIDGING THE GAF
The issues of national criticality and the need for bridging the gap
between the RiT Base and industry raise numerous fundamental questions
in economic and political doctrines aad policies. Although many of
these questions should be addressed in the long run, the panel, in
recognition of the relatively near-term nature of the NASA program
1The RiT Base consists primarily of discipline-oriented and applied
research.
1
2decisions being addressed, judged national criticality in terms of the
need to ensure that essential R&D program decisions made now do not
foreclose the timely availability of future options to meet national
requirements and the need to avoid possible major negative effects on
the contributions of NASA and the aerospace industry to the national
economy, the national defense, and the national transportation system.
The panel generally accepted the principle expressed by the Office
of Managament and Budget that " technology development and
demonstration projects with relatively near-term commercial
applications will be curtailed as an inappropriate federal subsidy."
The panel noted, however, the difficulties in the early stages of R&D
of separating military from commercial applications, of determining
whether innovations will be achi eved in the near or the long term, and
of defining where in the spectrwit
 of the R&D process particular
program activities should be characterized.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE REVIEW
The panel's assessments were based on the following additional
considerations:
o The hiatory of undisputed success in aeronautics research and
technology under existing divisions of labor among NASA, the
Department of Defense, and the private sector (universities and
industry) and the effective dissemination of research ideas among the
nation's research teams.
o The multipurpose nature of much of NASA's research and the
difficulty in identifying programs and technologies with exclusively
military or commercial applicability. Much aeronautical technology in
transports, in the engine field, and in helicopters is equally
applicable to defense as to civil aviation needs.
o The nature of the transport aircraft and engine manufacturing
industry, Whose commercial product bears a very high price tag and
whose product development costs are of the order of the worth of a
large company (typically 62 billion for the development of a new
transport and $1 billion for the development of a new engine). These
industries engag! mss& n(:ar-term technology demonstration to extend the
state-of-the-art into improved products.
The crucial element in determining which products of NASA
research will be developed is confidence in a technical ^28e. This is
essential before a manufacturer can responsibly commit the enormous
funding needed for development of a new product.
o The good long-term economic performance of the U.S. aircraft and
aircraft engine industries in both the civil and military sectors
(these industries account for 10 percent of U.S. exports in the
nonagricultural sector) and the growing and increasingly effective
competition from foreign competitors who are heavily government
subsidized.
3In judging the importance and priority of specific demonstration
programs, the panel laid heaviest emphasis on the degree of innovation
involved, the breadth of applicability possible, and the extent of
development, demonstration, verification of concept, and validation In
an operational environment required before the new concept, component,
material, or device could be incorporated with acceptable technical
risk in production of civil or military aircraft.
FINDINGS
Although only seven Systems Technology projects were retained in the
FY 1983 budget request to Congress because they were judged to support
military needs, several of the nineteen excluded projects (see Table 2
on pages 8 and 9) were found by the panel to have medium to high
impact on natio,:al defense.
Of the excluded ongoing projects and new initiatives, the
following nine programs spanning the three major technology areas in
aeronautics were judged to be of the highest priority.
o In the area of structures, the three programs in
composites--Composite Primary Aircraft Structures (CPAS), Transport
Aircraft Composite Structures (TACS), and Advanced Composite Materials
RiT--are regarded as having the highest priority, with high potential
impact on safety, efficient transport, and the national economy and
moderate impact on national defense. The outlook for technical
success is good. Although industry is using some composite structures
in new aircraft and is doing considerable near-term R&D for further
application, it is not likely to take on in the near future such
programs as CPAS and TACS, which represent long-term objectives with
broad applicability.
o In the propulsion area, the Energy Efficient Engine (E3) and
the Advanced Turboprop Program (ATP) were judged to be of high
priority. The EJ
 progrrn has high potential impact on efficient
transport, the national economy, and national defense. The outlook
for technical success is good, but it is unlikely that industry would
undertake such a program in the near future.
The ground test phase of the Advanced Turboprop Program (ATP), in
which aerodynamic, structural, and acoustic characteristics will be
defined, is seen as having high priority along with some effort in
preparing for the flight test proo:am t =rase III), which will
eventually be required for an ade.ivate data base. The full
implementation of Phase III is also of high priority and represents a
very desirable acceleration of the program but is rated below the
other programs in urgency. Suc•^essful technological development of
the advanced turboprop will have high potential impact on efficient
transport, the national economy, and national defense. The outlook
for technical success is fair to good, and it is improbable that
industry would undertake this work in the near future.
o In the area of aerodynamics, three activities were singled out
as high priority programs--RaIrly Efficient Transport (EET), High
4Perform.nce Military R&T, and Productivity Improvement. Completion of
the remaining work in the BET program should iesult L: benefits to
efficient tran.00rt and the national economy. High Performance
Military R&T will provide a basis for NASA to continue its strong role
in technology developments to improve future military aircraft.
Productivity Improveeent is grouped with the aerodynamic activities
because it will improve facilities that are used primarily for
aerodynamic investigations.
The panel believes that the implementation of these high-priority
activities will result in a focused and balanced program, enabling
advances in all three major divisions of aeronautical
technology--structures, propulsion, and aerodynamics.
Some degree of support within the R&T Base is regarded as
appropriate for several ongoing projects, as well as for the new
initiative Small Engine Components. These projects include three that
NASA itself nas proposed for the R&T Base.
The excluded Systems Technology projects and new initiatives
assigned a high priority are projected by NASA to cost somewhere
between $48 million and $79 million, depending or. the level of sum-)rt
allocated the ATP Phase III. (Three of these high-priority programs
totaling $14 million are new initiatives in the R&T Base.)
A further increase in the R&T Base of between $10 million and $20
million would appear to account for the inclusion of some level of
effort for the K&T Base components of Systems Technology projects
being terminated and deemed appropriate for funding within this
category.
OTHER CONCERNS
Several issues arose in the panel's deliberations about which its
members wish to express concern.
New Initiatives
The panel views with great concern the deferral of NASA's new
initiatives in aeronautics for the past two fears. The absence of
such long-term R&D programs, while not felt in the near berm, may
result in severe setbacks in the U.S. defense and ecork-eic posture in
the long term.
Adequacy and Balance of R&T Base Program
Finally, the panel wishes to express its concern over the generally
declining trend in support of NASA aeronautical R&D over the past
several years and the even steeper decline in out-of-house effort
relatives to in-house effort (see Figure 2 in Chapter 6). It is
especially concerried about the decline in support of university
programs in a period when universities are experienalag severe
financial stresses and when the need for educating scientists and
5engineer& to meat national requirements is of great importance. In
tno panel's view, the continuation of these trends would be sio&.
unfortunate for future prograss 'n ► aeronautics in the united States,
having serious adverse effects on the national economy and national
defon".
1Introduction
NASA's Aeronautics Research and Technology Program is divided into two
major elements, the Research and Technology Base and Systems
Technology. The Research and Technology Base consists primarily of
discipline-oriented research And applied research. Systems
Technology, as described by NASA, consists predominantly of technology
demonstration/proof-of-concept activities and, to a much lesser
extent, technology validation in those research areas that have shown
promise.
The FY 1983 budget submitted to Congress for NASA's Aeronautics
Research and Technology Program is substantially lower than its level
of prior years in constant dollars, aP shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.
While that part of the budget allocated to the Research and Technology
Base is slightly higher than in past years, the Systems Technology
budget is only 25-30 percent of its level in the 1973-1981 period.
The budget excludes any new initiatives and retains only those
programs that had been judged to support military needs (see the
Office of Management and Budget's Special Analysis K in Appendix D).
The Systems Technology projects proposed for termination are those
that nad been viewed as supporting primarily civil aviation. Table 2,
derived from NASA-furnished infort-ation, shows the FY 1983 budget for
NASA's Aeronautics Research and Technology Program. The three columns
reflect the originally proposed NASA program, a reduced program
proposed by NASA, and the appropriations request to Congress.
The congressional request (Appendix A) is for an assessment of the
national criticality of excluded programs, the risk associated with
achieving the objectives sought by each one, and the degree to which
each one might be assumed by the private sector.
Th: charge to the panel from the Committee on NASA Program Reviews
(Appendix C) calls for an assessment of those projects excluded from
the proposed FY 83 budget, the likelihood that industry would
undertake them, the impact of their not being done, and the more
general issue of government support for aeronautics beyond the
research phase.
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TABLE 1 Aeronautics R&T Profile, Fiscal Years 1973-1983
(in FY 1983 dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Aeronautics R&D 371.8 388.2 345.6 336.5 327.2 366.1 385.1 606.0 322.6 256.0 232.0
Research and Tech-
nology Base 186.7 184.9 173.5 161.5 156.1 156.2 160.0 159.1 156.9 177.1 182.0
Systems Technology 187.1 20j.3 172.3 173.0 171.1 207.9 225.1 246.9 163.5 76.9 50.0
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FIGURE 1 Aeronautics RLT Profile, Fiscal Years 1973-1983
(in FY 1983 dollars)
8TABLE 2 NASA Aeronautics R&T FY 1983 Budget
NASA	 Request
Request	 Reduced	 to
Program
	
to OMB	 Budget	 Congress
R6T Base	 217.8	 203.5	 182.0
Aerodynamics 49.2 45.2 42.3
Propulsion 46.8 49.8 43.0
Materials and Structures 28.5 31.8 31.3
Aircraft Controls and Guidance 9.9 13.9 12.9
Human Factors 9.6 10.6 9.6
Multidisciplinary Research 6.6 6.6 3.5
General Aviation/Commuter 8.5 -- --
Low-Speed 12.4 13.4 12.4
High-Speed 36.5 32.2 27.0
Transport 9.8 -- --
Productivity Improvement* (	 6.0) a (--) (--)
Advanced Composite Materials R&T* (	 4.0) (--) (--)
High-Performance Military RAT* (	 4.0) (--) (--)
Systems Technology 153.2 92.5 50.0
Systems Studies 2.9 2.9	 --
Materials and Structures 3.1 0.1	 --
Integrated Program for Aerospace
Vehicle Design (IPAD) 1.6 0.1	 --
Aeroelasticity of Turbine Engines 1.5 --	 --
Propulsion 8.7 4.2	 --
Helicopter Transmission Technology 1.5 --	 --
Critical Aircraft Resources/Broad
Property Fuels 4.2 4.2	 --
Small Engine Technology* 3.0 --	 --
Advanced Propulsion 57.8 16.8	 --
Energy Efficient Engine 17.0 7.0	 --
Advanced Turboprop Systems 9.8 9.8	 --
Advanced Turboprop Systems Phase III* 31.0 --	 --
Low-Speed 38.8 38.3	 30.0
Rotorcraft Operating Systems 1.5 1.5	 1.5
Powered Lift Technology 2.0 2.0	 --
Advanced Rotor System Technology 5.6 5.6	 5.6
TRRA Systems Technology 1.8 1.8	 --
*New Initiative
allon-Add--Included in R&T Base figures
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
NASA	 Request
Request	 Reduced	 to
Program	 to OMB	 Budget	 Congress
Advanced Rotorcraft Technology 18.0 18.0 13.5
Low-Speed Simulation and Flight
Systems Support 9.9 9.4 9.4
High-Speed 20.5 19.5 20.0
High-Perfo:mznce Flight Research 9.1 8.1 13.3
Highly-Maneuverable Aircraft
Technology 1.1 1.1 1.1
Turbine Engine Hot Section
Technology 10.3** 10.3** 5.6
Transport 21.4 10.7 --
Laminar Flow Control (LFC) 6.7 -- --
Energy Efficient Transport (EET) 1.1 1.1 --
Composite Primary Aircraft
Structures 2.0 2.0 --
Terminal Configured Vehicle 7.6 7.6 --
Transport Aircraft Composite
Structures* 4.0 -- --
TOTAL 371.0 296.0 232.0
*Ntw Initiative
**Transferred from Materials and Structures
Approach
The panel met on April 15-16, April 30-May 1, and June 9-10, 1962. A
team of NASA engineering executives briefed the panel and participated
in discussions with the members (Appendix E). The panel also received
briefings from representatives of the Aerospace Industries
Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the
Department of Defense, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
and it held informal discussions with representatives of the Office of
Management and Budget and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (Appendix F).
The panel took account of other National Research Council studies
that dealt with NASA's aeronautics program, which include the
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board's seven volumes on NASA's Role
in Aeronautics: A Workshop (1981) and its reports NASA's aeronautics
Research and Technology Base (1979) and NASA's Aeronautics Program:
Systems Technology and Experimental Programs (1980) as well as the
current Review of Advanced Technology Competition and the
Industrialized Allies. In addition, the panel was informed of other
current activities dealing with government support of aeronautics,
including the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy's
review of U.S. aeronautics research and technology policy and the
hearings of congressional authorization and appropriations committees.
The panel considered the NASA Aeronautics Research and Technology
Program, addressing specifically the 13 Systems Technology projects
originally proposed for continuation in FY 1983 and subsequently
proposed for termination and the originally proposed six new
initiatives that were subsequently excluded. These programs and their
budgetary alternatives are shown in Table 2.
In considering the individual programs, the panel has been charged
with addressing the following questions.
1. Is it necessary for the government to bridge the gap between
the aeronautics Research and Technology Base and early application
with regard to safety, national defense, efficient transport, and the
national economy?
2. What is the outlook for success and what are the time horizops
of those projects excluded from the proposed FY 1983 budget? Would
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industry undertake these projects (now or later) if government does
not do them--and on what basis?
3. If neither government nor industry undertakes the projects
noted in question 2, what will be the impact with tsgard to safety,
national defense, efficient transport, and the nation.*! economy?
4. What should be the priorities within NASA's Aeronautics
Research and Technology Program?
The panel notes that within the RiT Base NASA proposis to
redistribute the activities encompassed in the categories of General
Aviation/Commuter and Transport to appropriate discipline-related
categories, as the latter already include research applicable to these
areas.
In considering its charge, the panel adopted the following
procedure.
o Describe, for each individual project or initiative, its
objectives and status derived from NASA documentation and give the
panel's findings.
o Combine in a summary table the assessments for excluded
projects, including the panel's rating of priorities as requested in
question 4.
o Discuss question 1 and other concerns of a general nature
separately (see Chapter 5, "Bridging the Gap").
Judgments regarding the criticality of individual programs were
influenced by the degree of completion of the program, the likelihood
of success of the present activity, and in severely cut programs
whether continuing work could appropriately be considered for
inclusion in the RiT Base. Other fundamental criteria for assessing
criticality are discussed in Chapter 3, "Considerations Affecting the
Review."
With respect to question •. of the charge, the panel noted the
detailed assessment of the NASA aeronautics program provided in the
seven-volume workshop report of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board and limited its own prioritization to ratings of high, medium,
and low. In many cases where the panel recommends that elements of a
program be included as an essential part of the RiT Base, no priority
rating has been assessed. Programs with continued funding, limited to
the low- and high-speed systems technology areas, are not considered
in the detailed technical discussions.
Two additional topics discussed by the panel, the role of NASA
system studies and possible joint industry R&D programs, appear as
Appendixes G and H.
3Considerations Affecting the Review
The request from the congressional committees asked that the review
evaluate, among other things, °the national criticality of these
programs." Determining the national criticality of NASA programs in
the broadest sense encompasses issues of economics, politics, and
national security. In each of these areas, there are widely divergent
views on theories, doctrines, and policies extant not only among the
experts but in the body politic at large. The time and effort
available for an in-depth examination of these issues by the panel
were extremely limited by the brief period allowed for this review and
precluded any attempt at extensive analysis of major issues in a
fundamental way.
The panel therefore undertook to address the question of national
criticality in as narrow a context as could reasonably meet the main
purposes of this review. To this end, the members recognized the
relatively immediate nature of the NASA program decisions involver] and
assumed that disruption of a major and relatively healthy national
industry through abrupt changes in the ground rules by the government
without time for the planning and implementation of alternative
courses of action to compensate for these changes would not be in the
national interest. Accordingly, national criticality was judged in
terms of the need to ensure that R&D program decisions made nr)w do not
foreclose the timely availability of future options to meet national
requirements and the need to avoid possible major negative effects on
the important contributions of NASA and the aerospace industry to the
national economy, the national defense, and the national
transportation system.
U.S. AERONAUTICAL R&D AND THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Aeronautical RiD and the aerospace industry in the United States are
characterized by a history of undisputed success in aeronautical
research and industrial technology under the existing division of
labor among NASA, the Department of Defense, universities, aad
industry. Industry has carried the major burden of R&D for civil
transports such as the Boeing 757, engines such as the PiW JT9D, and
12
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general aviation such as the Lear Fan 2100, and this amounts to a
substantial ongoing investment. At present, the United States' share
of commercial jet aircraft in airline service worldwide is about 90
percent. Aerospace exports in 1981 stood at $18 billion ($14 billion
civil) and accountac' for about 10 percent of all U.S. exports of
nonagricultural commodities. U.S. military aircraft are in high
demand throughout the non-Communist world and exports are limited by
government policy more than by demand. These military aircraft have
shown substantial margins of superiority in the limited combat
engagements that have occurred. While many factors other than the
direct contributions of R&D are involved in these successes in civil
and military aircraft development, production, and sales, R&D and its
effective transition to industrial applications have played an
essential part in achieving the present U.S. prominence in the world
marketplace for aircraft.
THE WORLD SCENE IN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF AEROSPACE PROGRAMS
For reasons of importance to national defense and prestige, and
because of potential benefits to transportation, industrial
development, and the economy, most of the highly developed nations
have, since the World War I era, supported national R&D establishments
in aeronautical technology.)
More recently, the involvement of foreign governments in
supporting the aerospace industry has greatly increased, going well
beyond direct support of R&D. In England ar; ,' France, the major
elements of the industry have been nationalized. In Germany and the
Netherlands, there is substantial government ownership and subsidy of
the principal companies. Moreover, in the civil transport sector
there is a sort of international cartel developing in Airbus
Industries, with its A-300, A-310, and proposed A-320, which preempts
purely national developments with political and to some extent
economic pressure applied to keep other countries from undercutting
the cartel. The trend toward cartelism is thus to some degree counter
to technological nationalism, which is also developing throughout the
world, not only in aerospace industries but in other high-technology
industries, such as microcircuits, microprocessors, and computers.
Government subsidies in civil transport development (and some other
!Examples (in their current incarnations) are the Royal Aircraft
Establishment (RAE) in England, Office National d'Etudes et de
Recherches Aerospatiales (ONERA) in France, Deutsche Forshungs and
Versuchsanstalt fur Luft and Raumafahrt (DFVLR) in Germany, Nationaal
Lucht and Ruimtevaartlaboratorium (NLR) in the Netherlands,
Flygtekniska Forsoksanstalten (FFA) in Sweden, and NASA in the United
States.
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high-technology products) go far beyond early stages of R&D, extending
to the nonrecurring costs of the manufacturing, inventory costs, and
marketing costs and including low-interest loans to buyers.
Furthermore, since many foreign airlines are themselves
nationalized or have other significant government financial
involvement, their choices of aircraft are subject to political
pressures, tie-in sales of desired military equipment, and trade
preferences and concessions made by governments. All of this is a far
cry from a free market in civil aircraft sales.
RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF AERONAUTICAL R&D
As long as no general political decision has been made in this country
to attempt to compete in similar terms with the growing tide of
foreign state capitalism, technological nationalism, and creeping
cartelism in the aerospace and other high-technology industries, the
panel is in substantial agreement with the principle (expressed in the
Office of Management and Budget's Special Analysis K) that "technology
development and demonstration projects with relatively near-term
commercial applications will be curtailed as an inappropriate federal
subsidy." However, the interpretation of this principle in
application to specific programs poses many difficult questions.
Commercial Versus Military
In the earlier stages of R&D, the problem in the aerospace industry of
defining what is "commercial" is difficult. Traditionally, the
military forces of the United States have derived substantial benefit
from commercial transport development, ranging from outright adoption
of versions of civil models (e.g., DC-3/C-47, DC-4/C-54, Lockheed
Electra/P-3, and DC-10/KC-10) to the development of specialized
military transports based on state-of-the-art civil transport aircraft
and engine technology (e.g., C-130 and C-141). Implicit in this
military dependence on commercial transport developments and
technology has been the underlying expectation that U.S. civil air
transport represented a highly advanced level of attainment at any
given time, so that little additional benefit could accrue to the
military from undertaking more advanced transport developments on its
own.
Actually, the exchange of technology between military and civil
aviation in any country and worldwide is a complex interactive
process. The situation is best described as the symbiotic nourishment
of a common pool of technology that serves both military and civil
needs, with each field of application not only drawing on the pool but
also constantly replenishing it through R&D to support the broad and
specific objectives of improving the performance, economy,
reliability, and maintainability of aircraft and engines for civil
transports and military combat aircraft. This interaction is nowhere
stronger than in the engine field.
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The military development of the high-bypass Tt-39 tan engine for
the C-5 is an interesting case. In the early 1960s, it was clear that
for the new very heavy logistics transport needed by the military, a
major advance in vehicle effectiveness could be achieved by using the
high-bypass fan engine, which was just then passing the threshold of
technical feasibility. Although the commercial advantages were also
obvious at that time, no development of such an engine for commercial
purposes was yet in prospect, so the military impetus pushed the
development through (competitively, including General Electric and
Pratt i Whitney in a technology and demonstrator engine phase). The
losing airframe and engine competitors, Hoeing and Pratt i Whitney,
launched the commercial 747 wide-body jet transport program. Other
wide-body transport programs such as the DC-10, L-1011, and Airbus
followed, most of which used engines derived from the military
demonstrator engines. (Rolls Royce, in a fierce effort to remain
competitive for transport engines, developed the RS-211 later, which
was used in the L-1011= but it found much less widespread application
than did the GECF6 and the P&W JT9D.)
The helicopter field is another one where the line between
military and civil technology is hard to draw, and there is virtually
no new field of this technology currently under investigation which
does not have both military and civil applications. The tilt-wing
aircraft currently under investigation at NASA is an example. There
is no way to judge at this time in what sphere the best and earliest
applications may be found.
Turbopropeller engine applications may well be viewed as limited
to civil transport, but it is equally likely that a tactical
intratheater transport (a C-130 replacement) or a long-range naval
patrol aircraft (a P-3 replacement) may be the most attractive use of
that technology. Similarly, the use of composite primary structures
on large aircraft may be seen as having its greatest likely payoff in
civil transport, but its use for long-range and long-endurance
military aircraft for the missions already mentioned, for new
missions, such as the continuous patrol aircraft basing mode (which,
although now abandoned for the MX, is still under consideration in
other missions), or for strategic command and control is a likely
possibility.
In judging the priority and desirable timing of NASA programs, the
panel gave attention to both military and civil applications. When
particular programs seemed likely to serve military and civil ends and
to fall with the existing divisions of responsibility and effort
between the Department of Defense and NASA, the panel considered them
appropriate NASA programs.
Near Term Versus Long Term
It is often difficult to predict in what time frame a new development
may occur. In fact, the emphasis give: to a new technology in RAD,
including the demonstration and confidence-building phases, may be a
primary determinant of when the new technology is ready for
application. Thus, the Department of Defense R&D program in
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high-strength composite structures (based on boron fibers but
subsequently expanded to include carbon and other fibers) began in
1963. Aggressive pursuit of this program in a joint
government-industry program resulted in the use of a boron fiber
composite horizontal tail surface in an operational aircraft, the
F-14, in less than 10 years. A constantly expanding domain of
application has followed since then. Withtat an aggressive R&D
program, the time to first application might well have been twice as
long.
NASA's recent discovery of the value of winglets for drag
reduction has found almost immediate possibilities for application in
military aircraft, civil transport, and general aviation aircraft.
Yet there is little doubt that it was appropriate for NASA to have
worked on it. The supercritical wing is yet another recent NASA
technology advancement that found relatively quick acceptance and
application to a wide range of aircraft.
The real issue in these developments that warranted support in the
NASA program was the degree of innovation involved, the broad
applicability possible, and the extent of development, demonstration,
verification of concept, and validation in an operational environment
required before the next concept, component, or device could be
incorporated with acceptable technics'& and economic risk in the
production of civil or military aircraft. These characteristics were
generally given heavy weight in the panel's determination regarding
the appropriateness of specific NASA programs, especially those
designated as "systems technology."
A further consideration in regard to technological developments of
broad application is that, unlike NASA, industry is highly competitive
and has proprietary interests; hence, the diffusion of its technology
is considerably slower than that produced under NASA auspices.
PROGRAM DEFINITIONS AND "PACKAGING"
The fields of applied engineering science relevant to aeronautics may
involve theoretical and experimental work ranging across the entire
R&D spectrum, from the fundamentals of physics and chemistry to design
and testing of full-scale structures and vehicles. One of the great
strengths of NASA (and its predecessor, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics or NACA) in aeronautics has been that, short
of developing specific vehicles for manufacture and operational use,
there has been no limitation on where in the spectrum of R&D it might
conduct its research. Its staff and facilities have been engaged in
efforts to support ongoing military and civil developments as well as
in programs to seek longer-range advancements in the performance,
economy, and utility of a broad range of air vehicles.
The characterization of the various stages of aeronautical R&D as
fundamental or basic and xrplied research, development, or technology
is to a considerable extent arbitrary. Technology itself covers a
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range from theoretical analyses and small-scale laboratory experiments
to complete system designs and manufacturing processes. All large
organizations, and especially the government, have a tendency to use
certain terminologies for purposes of budgeting and controlling
programs, terminologies that by historical evolution the organization
has accepted but that do not have any transcendental or universal
significance in the RiD process.
Moreover, if some particular sphere cf application is favored at a
given time, projects having multiple applications will tend to be
described as having primarily the favored application. For example,
during the 1970s, and particularly after fuel price rises and
shortages precipitated the energy crisis and affected civil transport
economics reverely, this phenomenon caused NASA's justifications for
programs to gravitate toward transport aviation and fuel efficiency.
Yet efforts to reduce drag, structural weight, and engine-specific
fuel conswmption have been the main thrusts of aeronautical R&D since
the dawn of aviation and remain the essential factors in iicreasing
operating efficiency.
Thus, the contents of individual programs must be examined ab
initio to remove purely semantic factors from program assessments.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
As already noted, there are many widely divergent views held both by
experts and others within the government, in its executive and
legislative branches, and by the public con4erning economic theories
and policies that should be applied in determining appropriate
government activities in support of civil applications. The panel did
not attempt to arrive at a consensus on these major national economic
issues but dealt with the economic aspects of specific NASA programs
on a more pragmatic basis, which is described above and in Chapter 5,
"Bridging the Gap." However, in the panel's judgments on the economic
value of NASA programs, it did attempt to take into account the
following general economic and budgetary considerations. (A specific
discussion of the impact of NASA aeronautics programs on the national
economy is given at the conclusion of Chapter 4.)
In economic terms, research often constitutes a public good and,
as such, clearly merits a claim on public resources. However, such a
claim is not valid for all forms of research or for unrestricted
resources. Those who request or recommend that resources be committed
to a specific area of research have an obligation to analyze and to
limit rigorously their requirements.
Trends in the budget over time, however, allow a case to be made
that expenditures in discretionary areas have fallen as a percentage
of the budget over the last 20 years and will fall further over the
next several years. Such a shift of composition inevitably squeezes
expenditures such as research, +there returns occur over time and
cannot be stated with precision. There is a danger that research
expenditures will inexorably be driven from the budget as incremental
comparisons are made with expenditures that seem more compelling at
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the time. The comparison of research versus human resource
expenditures constitutes an extremely difficult dileas-a.
Research, development, and commercialisation expenditures
represent a continuum. At some imprecise point in the continuum,
public expenditures represent basic, fundamental, or generic research
and as su:h are highly appropriate. At other points, expenditures are
clearly more appropriately and efficiently undertaken by the private
sector. There is a gray area between these points where the
appropriateness of public expenditures varies with the opportunity,
the state of the economy, and international competitiveness.
National competitiveness is necessarily an important
consideration. In an imperfect world economy, nations do and will
support major industries through research in order to keep or develop
jobs or exports. The United States must remain aware of these trends
and be prepared to cope with them.
But in the final analysis ours is a mix--d economy. Competition
for public resources is extremely sharp, and we must depend on private
sector research. Corporations cannot depend on the public sector to
carry their research burden and must be prepared to take research
risks and develop new investment mechanisms. Accelerated cost
recovery, safe harbor leasing, and research and development
partnerships are all recent policy developments that should increase
the rate of return to capital investment and, therefore, provide a
stimulus for private sector research. However, the net effects of
these recent changes in economic factors cannot yet be definitively
evaluated.
4Programs Excluded from the NASA FY 1983 Budget
An examination of the specific programs and initiatives that have been
reduced or deletsd in the FY 1983 budget appears on the following
pages. The three major funding levels that hAve been proposed for
each program appear in Table 2. The panel has co:sidered collectively
the three programs dealing with composite materialst otherwise the
order follows that of the budget explanation in Tabli 2. Statements
regarding program objectives and status are darived from NAM
documents and briefings and from elaboration sought by individual
panel members from appropriate NASA representatives. They do not
reflect the panel's views, which are contained solely in the finuings.
The category labeled by NASA as Systems Studies has not been
considered as an individual project. The panel believes that such
paper studies are essential to NASA, to the Jepartment of Defense, and
to industry for the purpose of identifying potential new areas of
aeronautics research and technology, but that funding for them is more
properly included within the relevant disciplines or technology
areas. (See Appendix G for a further discussion of Systems Studied.)
for some projects, the distinction of th it label between Systems
Technology studies and Research and Technology ease studies is not
clear-cut. NASA proposes to undertake within the R&T base some work
associated with a few of the excluded projects, and the panel itself
has considered certain other projects as equally appropriate to the
R&T ease.
RiT BASS
Facility productivity Improvement Pcagram
(Aerodynamics--New Initiative)
because of govarnment regulations, improvement and updating of data
acquisition and processing systems cannot bo supported under
Construction of Facilities funding. Over the years, the
rehabilitation and modernisation of exi:t±ng fecilities and tha
supporting data acquisition and processing system have been
inadequately funded. This initiative was an .attempt to reverse this
trend with $6 million in the first year directed toward providing
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equipment and systems to improve the productivity of two nationally
important unique wind tunnel facilities, namely the Transonic Dynamic
Tunnel and the Icing Research Tunnel.
Program Description and Status
Objectives To increase the overall annual throughput 70 percent by
shortening experiment set-up, installation, and removal time, by
automating facility and experimental systems, and by increasing
real-time data processing and reduction. In the first year, a
real-time data acquisition system was planned for the Transonic
Dynamics Tunnel at the Langley Research Center. Also in the first
year, the Icing Research Tunnel at Lewis Research Center would receive
an improved water spray syster., electrical power supplies, a force
balance system, temperature and exhaust control systems, and
rehabilitation of the steam system.
To Date Initiative denied.
Findings
These major aeronautical facilities are important national resources.
In recent years, nonscheduled equipment maintenance time has increased
and operating hours and occupancy hours have necessarily declined,
while backlogs a,^R building to the point where waits of 20-30 months
are typical. The safety implications of aircraft icing research
cannot be overemphasized. The panel regards this as the type of
expenditures that -annot be deferred indefinitely. There is virtually
no technical risk associated with these facility improvements.
OUTLOOK
NECES- MOULD INDUSTRY	 POTENTIAL IMPACT 	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Y
	
X	 H
	
H	 GOOD
COMPOSITE MATERIALS AND STRUCTURES
Description of Advanced Composites
Composites are engineering materials that result from combining two
materials in such a way that new or better properties are obtained
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from the combination. Reinforced concrete structures and fiberglass
boats are two successful current uses of composite materials.
Advanced composites for aerospace applications typically consist of
carefully oriented continuous fibers of carbon/grapbite embedded in a
polymeric resin such as epoxy. Kevlar and boron are other typical
fibers, and polyimides provide another type of resin. Advanced
composites offer a variety of benefits to aerospace structures, the
most notable being the possibility of a weight savings of 30 percent
or more. Other benefits include a freedom from corrosion, a fatigue
life vastly better than that of metals, and the possibility of
tailoring properties to meet specific load requirements by
preselecting the directions in which the reinforcing fibers are
oriented. Advanced composites are being used increasingly for lightly
loaded aerospace structures, and research is under way to provide the
technology needed to make large primary structures capable of handling
heavy loads.
Information regarding the three NASA programs on composite
materials and structures follows.
Advanced Composites Research
(R&T Base--New Initiative)
Program Description and Status
Objectives The proposed Advanced Composites Research Program
addresses the development of (1) second-generation composites
involvir;j new, tougher resin matrix materials, improved mechanical
properties, and increased environmental suitability= (2)
high-temperature resins, including curing mechanisms, improved room
and high temperature mechanical properties, and high-temperature
oxidation resistance; and (3) high-temperature composites, including
fiber reinforcement of superalloys (metals).
To Date Initiative denied.
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY
SARY	 UNDERTAKE
Yes/No Now Later Never
Y	 X
POTENTIAL IMPACT
Nat. Eff.	 Nat.
Safety Def. Tport. Econ.
H	 M	 H	 H
OUTLOOK
FOR TECH-
NICAL
PRIORITY SUCCESS
H	 GOOD
Combined findings appear at the end of the description of the three
composites programs.
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Composite Primary Aircraft Structures (CPAS)
(Transport)
Program Description and Status
Objectives To develop composites technology for secondary and medium
primary transport aircraft structures and to provide a data base that
will permit safe and effective use of lightweight composites in
advanced transport aircraft.
To Date With $88 million expended and 1983 scheduled to be the last
year of this portion of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACES) program,
stiffness-critical composite structure is now considered to be
state-of-the-art and new aircraft are incorporating this technology;
B-757, B-767, and Lear Fan 2100 are in the certification process.
Secondary structure components have been certified and are in flight
service. Composite medium/primary structure components are now
completing ground test and certification programs. Success can be
measured by the weight saved in various aircraft components: the
L 1011 vertical fin had 28 percent weight saved (ground test in
progress); the B-737 horizontal stabilizer had 22 percent weight saved
(awaiting FAA certification).
Impact of Cancellation While technologies developed under this
program are already in use and demand is increasing as airlines gain
experience with composites, the program is not yet completed and the
technology base for the use of composites has not been completed.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY	 POTENTIAL IMPACT	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Y	 **	 X
	
H	 M	 H	 H	 H	 GOOD
Combined findings appear at the end of the descriptions of the three
composites programs.
**There has been some application in new aircraft.
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Transport Aircraft Composite Structures (TACS)
(Transport--New Initiative)
Program Description and Status
This program was planned to follow the Composite Primary Aircraft
Structures (CPAS) Program to use the composite technology developed
for secondary structures and medium primary structures as a base on
which to develop the technology for very large, heavily loaded
structures such as transport aircraft wings.
Objectives (1) To provide an independent data base for composite
primary structures technology for design verification and
certification. (2) To develop design, analyses, and test procedures
to evaluate composite primary structure designs and verify benefits,
integrity, and durability. (3) To develop technology for
large-dimensioned, highly loaded composite structure. Multiple
designs were planned, focused on major technology issues such as fuel
containment, electrical conductivity, lightning strikes, environmental
effects (rain, hail, ice, ultraviolet radiation), and interior
accessibility, and independent evaluations were planned of design and
test methodologies in large-scale structural systems tests.
To Date Initiative denied.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY	 POTENTIAL IMPACT
	
FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Y	 X
	
H	 M	 H	 H	 H	 GOOD
Combined Findings Regarding Composite Materials and Structures
The panel regards research on advanced aircraft composite structures
to be of the highest priority among all of the unfunded programs.
The ACEE Composite Primary Aircraft Structures Program has been
highly successful thus far by contributing significantly to an
accelerated acceptance of composites in many aircraft structural
applications. The scheduled wind-up of this program in 1983 will
complete the original plan, making available information still needed
for airline and FAA acceptance and certification of composite
structures for both secondary and primary structural applications.
The panel supports both of the proposed new initiatives in
aircraft composite structures, which are designed to supply research
in different but related areas: (1) primary composite structures
design approaches, alternatives, and a technology data base= (2)
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research and understanding of the critical technologies for
second-generation composite structures having lighter weight, more
ruggedness, and higher temperature capabilities.
From a safety standpoint, the panel regards NASA's work in
composites as essential to provide an independent data base for FAA
certification requirements. In addition, these projects are viewed as
having high potential impact on efficient transport and the national
economy and moderate impact on national defense. The outlook for
technical success of these projects is good. Although some composite
structures are being used in some new aircraft, it is unlikely that
industry would undertake projects such as CPAS and TACS in the near
future, and the time element is important.
RiT BASE
Sigh-Perfo:mance Military R&T
(Aeronautics--New Initiative)
Program Description and Status
Objective This program represents an enhancement of other
high-performance activities and is aimed at aerodynamic integration
for advanced missions such as supersonic cruise and maneuver, stealth,
and Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL). The five parts of the program
are (1) analyses to include estimates of aerodynamic performance and
stability/control and correlations with wind tunnel results;
(2) computations to apply existing aerodynamic codes and, if required,
develop new codes for advanced unconventional configurations; (3)
ground-based piloted simulations to assess handling qualities,
including effects of integrated flight/propulsion controls; (4) use of
ground facilities such as altitude chambers at Lewis Research Center
for tests of new inlet/nozzle concepts and high temperature materials,
and (5) wind tunnel tests to emphasize supersonic cruise, transonic
maneuvering, and low-speed stability and control.
To Date Initiative denied.
Findings
The panel regards this program as one where NASA has an important role
to play in basic research and technology. NASA should be at the
"cutting edge" in designing experimental methodology and analyses.
_
	
	
While industry may have the capability and some of the facilities to
undertake a portion of this work, their efforts can be more
productively applied to configurations and systems design. In the
panel's view, the sum of such individual efforts would not equal the
effectiveness and possible payoff fr-)m NASA's undertaking and
coordinating these activities. These technologies are seen as 	 1j
(
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critical to national security, and hence are considered of high
priority. The outlook for technical success is good.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY
	
POTENTIAL IMPACT	 FOR TECH-
SARY
	 UNDERTAKE	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Y
	
H	 H	 GOOD
MATERIALS AND STRUCTURES
Integrated Program for Aerospace Vehicle Design (IPAD)
Program Description and Status
Original Objective To improve engineering productivity by developing
technology and computer software for management of integrated design
and manufacturing data (project-level engineering and manufacturing
information) .
Original Results Expected (1) IPAD data management to be established
on CDC and IBM host computers. (2) Data base requirements to support
Air Force Integrated Computer Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) effort.
Revised Scope Data management software technology will be limited to
single host computers and there will be no networking capability.
Impact of Cancellation Program funding was reduced in FY 1982 and
deleted as a specific line item in FY 1983. Development of technology
and software for multiformat crapany-wide data base management will be
limited to a single host computer system without geometry capability;
data management of the Air Force ICAM program cannot be supported;
computer networking capability will not be developed, nor will key
elements of this technology be transmitted to industry.
Findings
The panel recognizes NASA'x contributions in computer-aided design and
manufacturing areas but finds that industry is rapidly assuming this
activity. Even now, industry is working to include procurement and
fiscal and quality assurance in addition to engineering and
manufacturing design. While the goals of the program can be considered
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high in national importance with a good outlook for success, the panel
funds that at this stage some level of effort in the RiT Be", but not
necessarily that proposed by NASA, would be appropriate.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY
	
POTENTIAL IMPACT	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE
	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yen/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Boon. PRIORITY SUCCESS
(*) 1 	 X	 GOOD
Aercelasticity of Turbine Engines
Program Description and Status
Objective To develop verified analysis methods for prediction of
flutter onset for various turbine engine operational regions and
techniques to predict and minimize aeroelastic vibration effects in
turbine engines.
To Date The fundamental data for rotor vibration modes using rotor
spin rig tests have been acquired and analytical predictions have been
verified. The capability to predict onset of flutter for various
engine operational regions (subsonic, transonic, supersonic) has been
verified. The concept of mistuning rotor blades to control forced
vibration response levels has been analytically demonstrated.
Impact of Canzellation Program funds were reduced in FY 1982 and
deleted as a specific line item in FY 1983. Although this work will
be supported in the RiT Base at a minimum level, contracts and grants
supporting analytical requirements for forced response analysis will
be limited. Development of coupled aerodynamic-structural engine
dynamic analysis capability, not yet available in industry, will be
extended through the late 1980's. Concept studies for minimizing
engine vibration response levels will be reduced in scope.
lAn asterisk denotes that some level of effort within the R&T Base
is appropriate. In most of these cases, priorities are not assigned.
i
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Findings
The long history of engine structural failures demonstrates that
safety is coupled with engine reliability, with vibrations, flutter,
and distortion affecting that reliability. Industry believes that it
has sufficient tools to avoid major problems with compressors and
fansi analysis is checked by model tests and then in development
component and engine tests at sea level and altitude. Although there
are some surprises, they are worked out during development and early
production at moderate cost to industry. The panel concurs that a
modest effort in the NASA R&T Base is appropriate, preferably
concentrated on new areas and problems.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WILD INDUSTRY
	 POTENTIAL IMPACT 	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE
	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
PROPULSION
Helicopter Transmission Systems
Program Description and Status
Objectives This program was designed to reduce the weight, size,
cost, maintenance, and noise of helicopter transmission systems with
technology transfer and information exchange achieved through
out-of-house participation. Advanced mechanical components and
lubrications technology were to be validated, and new generic
computational analysis methods were to be developed.
To Date This transmission work is a joint effort with the U.S. Army
Research and Technology Laboratory located at the NASA Lewis Research
Center and is primarily directed toward Army requirements. A portion
of the program involves contract fabrication of an advanced 500 hp
transmission by Bell Helicopters, from which data will be shared.
Another part of the program uses the NASA/Lewis UH-60 assets. This
3000 hp transmission facility provides a data base for lubricants,
vibration, noise, efficiency, and stress for new systems and for
modifications to current ones. The program calls for testing of
single and t.ain input, split torque, and hybrid transmissions. At
this time, NASA has participated in the program in the amount of
approximately 07 million.
IL,: ,
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Impact of Cancellation Program funds were reduced in FY 1982 and
deleted as a specific line item in FY 1983. Withdrawal of NASA will
stretch out the program or require an increase in Army funding. It
will delay develop- t of kiew transmission designs that reflect major
advances in weight and compactness for future helicopters. However,
it is anticipated that the program will be supported in part with R&T
Base funds.
Findings
While the main, thrust of this program has been toward military use, an
application to civil aircraft is anticipated. A NASA withdrawal would
mean the removal of trained, experienced research engineers from the
program, with a corresponding decrease in chances for success. The
potential impact of this program with respect to the criteria
established is moderate. The outlook for technical success is good.
It is unlikely that industry would undertake such a project in the
near future.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY	 POTENTIAL IMPACT 	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE	 Nat. Eff. Nat.	 NICAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Y	 X
	
M	 M	 L	 M	 M	 GOOD
Critical Aircraft Resources
(includes completion of Broad Property Fuels)
Program Description and Status
Objectives To provide focused technology aimed at relieving the
United States of supply instabilities and cost escalations associated
with aviation turbine fuels and strategic materials.
To Date Completion of Broad Property Fuels Phase I included tests of
production and advanced combustor concepts operating with
broadened-property fuels; initial comparisons with jet A indicate a
significant increase in liner temperatures for production combustors
when using broadened-property fuels; advanced double annular combustor
concepts demonstrated sensitivity to reduced fuel hydrogen content.
Impact of Cancellation It will eliminate engine system evaluation and
full-scale verification tests of new fuel-flexible combustor concepts,
with the remaining work being scaled down to include only component rig
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tests. Also eliminated are major augmentations in the area of
Alternative Fuels and Strategic Materials, the goals of which were to
establish a detailed understanding of fuel property variations on
advanced generic engine/aircraft fuel system technology and to achieve
a 30 percent reduction in the use of strategic elements in turbine hot
section components.
Findings
U.S. dependence on nondooestic sources for fuel and strategic
materials makes this a timely field. However, the fuel definitions
and timing are unclear. A modest effort in the R&T Base is
appropriate, but the work on developing new combustor concepts with
full-scale engine tests may be premature. Complementary work being
sponsored by the Department of Defense to broaden JP 4 and JP 5 fuel
specifications and explore the use of shale oil is noted. As
economies in production and distribution systems compel use of a
broader range of fuels, implications for air safety will need to be
thoroughly researched. The panel finds that research on fuels is an
appropriate area for government leadership in establishing goals and
sponsoring R&D since there is little incentive to industry except in
areas of possible cost reduction.
OUTLOOK
NECES- WOULD INDUSTRY	 POTENTIAL IMPACT
	 FOR TECH-
SARY	 UNDERTAKE
	 Nat. Eff. Nat.
	 N.CAL
Yes/No Now Later Never Safety Def. Tport. Econ. PRIORITY SUCCESS
Small Engine Component Technology
(New Initiative)
Program Description and Status
Objectives To provide advanced component technology for low thrust
engines intended for potential application to future rotor craft,
commuter and general aviation, and cruise missile propulsion systems
(300-4,000 shaft horsepower [shp)). This program would seek to
develop a fundamental understanding and analytical data base for
steady and unsteady flows, combustion, and heat transferl to simplify
designs, thereby reducing costs: and to improve thersal efficiency for
&20 percent reduction in specific fuel consumption. It includes
detailed component flow mapping, development and verification of
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computational methods, and evaluation of specific advanced component
technologies and concepts. Milestones planned for this program are in
FY 1985, component analytical design techniques to be established
using both computational and experimental methodsi in FY 1987,
completion of design verification testing of advanced technology
engine components= and in FY 1988, verified analytical codes available
for industry.
To Date Initiative denied.
Findings
Several substantially different engines are in the category of small
engines: 300-600 shp general aviation prop power, 500-800 lb thrust
military cruise missiles, and 850-4,000 shp civil and military
helicopter/turboprop propulsion.
There is a need for improved small general aviation engines in the
under-500 shp category. Of special interest are engines with an
intermittent combustion cycle that burn kerosene instead of gasoline.
This NASA program does not appear to address the latter category, but
the panel was informed that NASA is conducting appropriate and
important work in the R&T Base.
There are several 850-5,000 shp military and commercial engine
developments under way or planned in the United States and
overseas--e.g., Pratt i Whitney's PT7/PW100 series, General Electric's
T700/CT7, and the U.S. Army's planned 5000 demonstrator. The market
is very large, consisting of several thousand units per year for
turboshafts, turboprops, and turbofan spinoffs. Large reductions in
fuel consumption--up to 20-30 percent in some power ranges--are
possible. The engine technology is essentially identical for military
_ and commercial aircraft, but it differs from that for large engines in
that the compressors are usually axi- or dual-centrifugal and there is
more emphasis on first cost.
Development of small engines now lags behind that of large
engines, and inadequate advanced research has been done in this area
in recent years. Thus, the panel recognises a need for aggressive
advanced component work in the RiT Base complementing the Department
of Defense's activities and aimed at a new generation of engines for
the 1990 1 x. The outlook for technical success is good. The potential
impact with respect to the criteria established is moderate. Industry
is not likely to undertake such activity in the near future.
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ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Energy Efficient Engine (83)
Program Description and Status
Original Objective To provide the technology base for a new
generation of fuel-efficient turbofan engines with lower fuel
consumption and reduced operating costs relative to current
high-bypass-ratio engines.
To Date Contracts for component technology development and evaluation
in an integrated engine system were awarded to General Electric and
Pratt i Whitney in 1977. Approximately 75 percent of the program
expenditures have been made, but success remains to be confirmed by
testing of the complete engine. Program goals have been exceeded with
a 90 percent efficiency fan rig test; rig tests of a 10-stage
23s1-pressure-ratio high compressor achieved goal levels of efficiency
and surge margin; two-tone, segmented-liner combustors achieved
emission goals (except for nitrous oxide) and met or exeeded goals for
exit profile and pattern factor; 1-2 percent turbine efficiency gains
relative to current turbines were achieved; and 80-85 percent mixing
effectiveness in exhaust gas mixer scale model tests have been
demonstrated. Component technology development has been completed,
and hardware is being readied for integrated core engine system
evaluation under FY 1982 funding.
Impact of Cancellation Immediate: General Electric will eliminate
second integrated core and low spool test; Pratt i Whitney will
eliminate all engine systems tests, including evaluation and
validation of low spool components, active clearance control system,
full-scale mixer performaro:*, component interactions, systems dynamics
and transient operation, component performance in real environment,
and impact of secondary flows and losses. Industry teams will be
disbanded, and a large government investment in test bed engines will
be lost for follow-on research programs. Future: Years will be lost
before industry can pick up or obtain military funding for components
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of the program since major companies have hundreds of millions of
dollars committed to near-term turbofan developments.
Findings
The E3
 program is a classic systems technology engine demonstration
program of the type that NASA, the Department of Defense, and the U.S.
engine industry have used over the last 30 years to advance the
state-of-the-art and establish the data base required for industry to
make commitments for engineering development of jet engines. These
are not prototype or production engines, although some features may be
included in near-term engines. This has been a large program, funded
at $20-$25 million per year for each of the two contractors, and a
successful one to date, even though the core and complete systems
tests still lie ahead. NASA has worked well with the engine and
aircraft industry to establish requirements with high payoff for the
long term and has done a good job in managing this complex program.
The state-of-the-art of each engine component is being advanced, and a
major step forward in the overall cycle pressure ratio is being
achieved.
The only active government system technology program for large
subsonic engines is the NASA E 3 . The Department of Defense is not
developing work on high-bypass turbofans or large turboprop gas
generators and looks to NASA for support in this area. Engine
technology for commercial subsonic transports and large military
subsonic transports, tankers, and long-endurance aircraft is
identical. Moreover, the technology for high-bypass turbofans and for
large turboprop gas generators is very similar.
The panel regards such programs as E 3
 for subsonic engines and
the Department of Defense's Advanced Technology Engine Gas Generator
Program for supersonic engines as essential to provide the technology
necessary for continued U.S. leadership in military and commercial
engines. Thus, this activity is viewed as having high potential
impact on national defense, efficient transport, and the national
economy and is considered to be of high priority. The outlook for
technical success is good. Industry is not likely to undertake such
activity in the near future.
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Advanced Turboprop Program (ATP) and ATP. Phase III
The proposed aoc^leration of ATP was denied as a new initiative, and
the ongoing program is proposed for termination.
Program Description and Status
Ob actives To develop and evaluate the technology for efficient,
reliable, and acceptablo operation of advanced turboprop-powered
aircraft at cruise speeJs ranging from Hach 0.7 to 0.8 with attendant
reduced fuel consumption, emphasising flutter and structural dynamic
characteristics of advanced propellers and systems integration for
reduction of installation drag and cabin noise.
To Date Under the ACES Program, using subscale model tcsting, (1) an
uninstalled propeller efficiency of 80 percent at Much 0.8 has been
attained, (1) predictions of propeller near-field noise and fuselage
wall noise attenuation have been verified, and (3) preliminary
indications have shown that installation drag can be wall. The
derign approach for large-scale blades (8-10 ft in diameter) has been
selected.
Impact of Cancellation/Reduction No data base tram large-scale
experiments now exists for structural and aerodynamic characteristics
of advanced propellers. Furthermore, no timely large-scale tests will
be undertaken.
Descoped or delayed: Design, fabrication, and testing of
large-scale blades: experimental and analytical understanding of
propfan aeroelastic behaviors structure-borne noise evaluation, and
attenuation researcht installation aerodynamics data baia with optimal
nacelle/wing configuration.
Eliminated or deferred indefinitely: Large-scale ground and
flight scouatic experimental engine system component tests (gearbox,
pitch change, control, inlet); large-scale system integration flight
research at Mach O. r. at 30,000 ft.
Findings
This program will be of critical importance in the late 1980's and the
1990's. High-speed propeller work requires large-scale experimental
tests to validate noise, drag, aeroelastic and overall installed
performance in a credible way. It is unlikely that advanced
nigh-speed propeller propulsion will be chosen for short-haul
commercial and cargo systems or military systems without successful
experimental flight testing to pave the way. The question is whether
propellers can power aircraft in the Mach 0.7-0.8 range at 30-35,000
ft and prove more cost effective in some types of large military or
commercial aircraft than turbofans. A 15 percent reduction in fuel
appears to be possible, but some panel members were skeptics) about
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this and emphasised the need for data from large-scale tests and for
realistic assessments of total installed performance. Although this
to a controversial and high-risk program, it could have a profound
effect on long-endurance systems, land-based antisubmarine warfare
.Aissions, and intratheater transport as well as the 100-150 passenger
transport and commuter markets.
Regarding the substance of the program, the panel questions the
need to most the goals of Mach 0.8 should the 0.7-0.75 Mach range
prove more efficient. Inclusion of experimental work for viable
alternative advanced propellers, such as a counter-rotating prop, is
also recommended in the RAT Be". Early flight test of a large 8-9 ft
advanced propeller, and system studies to establish potential
advantages versus advanced turbofans, are indicated as well.
Very little work has been done on propellers, either small or
large, for many years. As the industry moves toward higher speeds
with larger, more complex propellers, data are needed to produce and
certify new types of propellers and gear boxes.
Considered as a high priority program, ATP is viewed as important
to development of efficient transport and holds high promise for
developing new economic markets. Its military implications make ATP
of at least moderate importance to national defense. While the
outlook for technical success can be viewed as fair to good, the
overall risk associated with this project is such that it is unlikely
that industry would undertake it in the near future. Phase III, the
new initiative, represents a highly desirable acceleration of the
flight research part of the total program, and some level of effort in
this phase is viewed as having the sarm degree of importance as the
ongoing ATP activity.
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LOW SPBBD
(Aerodynamics and Configurations)
Powered-Lift Technology
(Quiet Short-haul Research Aircraft (QSRA) Program)
Program Description and Status
Objective To generate and verify through flight research a technology
data base for the design of quiet, efficient, economical, and
environmentally acceptable short-haul aircraft for future civil and
military applications.
To Date The guest pilot evaluation program has been completed along
with successful shipboard evaluation on the USS R:Ltyhawk.
Impact of Cancellation Portions of the program are being continued at
reduced scope and pace under the High-Speed Systems Technology
activity. Criteria on flying qualities and laming field for use by
the FAA will be delayed, is well as further date. to support Navy Short
Take-off and Landing (STOL) efforts.
Findings
The QSRA Program is essentially at an end. In studying this program
in 1979, the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board concluded that it
"may have marginal application because of cost and complexity." NASA
has conducted technology demonstrations of STOL for many years, and
further work along these lines is unlikely to affect industry's
reluctance to develop STOL for commercial application at this time.
STOL will likely be developed first for military applications. It is
unlikely that industry would undertake such a project in the near
future. A modest continuing effort in the R&T Base or in High-Speed
Systems Technology is indicated.
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Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft
Program Description and Status
Objective To demonstrate and document tilt rotor technology for
military and civil applications and to document the operating flight
envelope, handling qualities, and terminal area characteristics.
To Date Successful demonstration of flight envelope to 318 knots and
verification of aeroelastic stability have been achieved, and the
initial data base is established.
Impact of Cancellation The following opportunities are eliminated:
completion of flight envelope documentation, support of Joint Services
V/STOL (JVX) development program, completion of mission suitability
testing, and flight test of advanced rotor and flight controls.
Findings
Two tilt rotor vehicles were built by Bell for this program. Bell has
received a modification to the contract that allows them to use one
craft for an extensive two-year flight test program to be carried out
at their expense. Data from this testing will become available to
NASA. NASA's advanced rotor development program still contains funding
to build and test a new composite-blade rotor for the remaining
vehicle.
This is the latter part of a big program, and the FY 1983 cuts are
in the lowest-priority part of the rotorcraft research and system
technology programs. With the increased activities by Bell and Boeing
Vertol, and the interest of the military in the tilt rotor, NASA's
investment in this technology demonstration has already proven to be a
success.
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TRANSPORT
(Aerodynamics and Configurations)
Laminar Flow Control (LFC)
Program Description and Status
Objectives To develop and demonstrate t. practical, reliable,
maintainable boundary-layer control system for significant drag
reduction of future transport aircraft, with the intent of
demonstrating laminar flow control tec! ,.nology for industry design of
LFC systems for advanced transport aircraft.
To Date The basic concept of LFC ?-is beer demonstrated, and progress
has been made in unique LFC airfoil design. The present effort, with
primary emphasis on development if the technology base for practical
operating systems, has not F a.:rded to the point of resolution of its
applicability.
Impact of Cancellation Because of the long-term nature of the LFC
research, there will be no immediate impact of cancellation. However,
resolution of the practicability of the potentially large benefits of
LFC in future aircraft design must be postponed indefinitely.
Findings
Unless NASA develops a reasonably practical control system, it is
unlikely there will be any application of LFC by industry. It is a
high-risk project with high payoff, if successful. Of all elements in
the program, this appears to offer the least likelihood of practical
operational success. Supporting this project rather than alternative
efficiency improvement programs does not seem advisable at this time:.
Safety may be compromised, rather than enhanced, due to the
uncertainty of uniform spanwise functioning of an LFC system.
National defense benefits are questionable, and long-term performance
and maintenance questions make a positive effect on the national
economy doubtful. But, in view of the potentially high returns, very
modest research efforts in the RiT Base level, as proposed by NASA,
seem worthwhile.
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Program Descriation and Status
Objectives To develop and demonstrate advanced aerodynamics and
active controls technology for application to derivative and new
transport aircraft. Completion of the proof-of-concept flight
evaluation of active controls systems and advanced technology airfoils
was anticipated.
To Date The aerodynamics data rase for high-aspect-ratio
supercritical wings, high lift devices, controls, and propulsion
integration has been developed along with techniques for structural
design and fault-tolerant computer design. Flight evaluations of
maneuver load control and relaxed static stability active control
concepts are completed. Winglets tailored for the KC-135 and DC-10-10
have been evaluated. Design evaluation of the integrated application
of active controls on a new transport design is completed, and a
flight data base on aerodynamic and inertial loading for B-747 engine
nacelles has been obtained. F-111 flight tests have shown that
increased laminar flow can be achieved for large transport aircraft.
Impact of Cancellation Although most of the originally planned RET
program has been completed (only $1.1 million was unfunded), the
program wrap-up would contribute significantly in documentation of
recent work and planning that could help industry and permit an
improved future RiT Base program--e.g., Lockheed's active pitch
control system development for the L-1011 airplane, all-electric
airplane technology development studies for reduced aircraft weight,
Douglas' high-aspect-ratio supercritical wing development refinement,
and Boeing's work to develop natural or hybrid laminar flow concepts
for future transport aircraft.
Findings
This program wrap-up is of only moderate risk and has a high
probability of success. The completion of this planned program is
cost effective because of the probable contributions to improved
aerodynamic and structural efficiencies of future long-range
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aircraft. This program is viewed as a nigh-priority one with high
potential impact on efficient transport and the national economy.
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Terminal Configured Vehicle (TCV)
Program Description and Status
Objectives To define functional requirements and performance criteria
for flight systems and displays of the future with which pilots can
safely and effectively operate in the evolving National Airspace
System; to make flight more efficient with respect to fuel, airspace,
and time; to increase traffic flow capacity (and reduce delays); to
improve operational capability in adverse weather; and to reduce noise
impact on the ground.
To Date The systems demonstrated to reduce pilot workload, improve
maneuvezing accuracy, and enhance safety include the first application
of all-digital systems in transport aircraft to display navigational
and flight controls in TCV 737; the first aircraft flights using
coupled curved approach paths and automatic landings with microwave
landings system (MLS) data for flare guidance; electronic cockpit
displays brought from laboratory to industry acceptance; area
navigation and guidance systems with many features not previously used
on civil aircraft; development of autoland flare law concepts with
great reduction in touchdown dispersion of high-speed runway turnoff
guidance systems; and minimum fuel flight profiles.
impact of Cancellation NASA expertise and facilities will not be
applied to a number of activities identified by the FAA in which
NASA's help would be import . - • t in implementing the FAA's 20-year plan
for updating and modernising the National Airspace System. New
airborne systems technology now in the laboratory development stage
may not have attained credibility in time for the next generation of
transport aircraft. Potential new aircraft benefits in safety and
fuel conservation could be jeopardised unless the Air Traffic Control
System is developed in a timely manner.
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Findings
The TCV has provided and can continue to provide important advances in
aircraft and terminal safety. The primary advantage of continuing
this program would be coordination with the FAA in overhauling the air
traffic system to deal with expected problems in terminal-area traffic
flow and safety. Integration of the human operator with advanced
displays is essential for ensuring safety as terminal-area congestion
increases. Simulation cannot accomplish the total task, and the TCV
has become an invaluable facility in which to verify simulation
results in a real world environment.
Results have clearly been applied in the latest U.S. transport
cockpits. While it is unrealistic to expect industry to continue this
project, it might be reasonable to expect a limited support of cockpit
human factors technology. In such a case, however, the broad
availability of the results of the work would be brought into question.
Were the TCV being newly established, members of the panel would
choose a smaller, more economical aircraft. However, since the B-737
has been made available, it seems sensible to use these existing
systems in the near term. NASA's plans to preserve the TCV with RiT
Base support appear reasonable to the panel.
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SUMMARY COMMENTS
A summary matrix of the panel's assessment of projects excluded from
the NASA FY 1983 budget request to Congress is given in Table 3.
Those excluded Systems Technology projects and new initiatives to
which the panel assigned a high priority, given by major technology
area in aeronautics and with the NASA budget estimates of Table 2, are:
o In the area of Structures and Materials
Composite Primary Aircraft Structures (CPAS) 	 $ 2	 million
Transport Aircraft Composite Structures (TACS)	 4
Advanced Composite Materials RiT	 4*
o In the area of Propulsion
Energy Efficient Engine (E3 )	 17
Advanced Turboprop Program (ATP) 	 9.8
Advanced Turboprop Program Phase 111 	 31
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o In the area of Aerodynamics
Energy Efficient Transport (ERT)	 1.1
High Performance Military R&T	 4*
Productivity Improvement 	 6*
With respect to the Advanced Turboprop Program, some effort in
preparing for the flight test phase--Phase III--is viewed as a high y
desirable complement to the ongoing ground test program, in which
aerodynamic, structural, and acoustic characteristics will be defined.
Thus, based on the NASA budget estimates, those programs assigned
a high priority total somewhere between $48 million and $79 million,
depending on the level of support allocated to ATP Phase III. Three
of these programs, totaling $14 million, fall within the R&T Base.
The panel believes the implementation of these high-priority
activities would result in a focused and balanced program, enabling
advances in all three major divisions of aeronautical technology--
structures, propulsion, and aerodynamics.
A further increase in the R&T Base of between $10 million and $20
million would appear to be a modest amount to account for the
inclusion of some level of effort for the eight Systems Technology
projects deemed appropriate for funding within this category.
NASA PROGRAM IMPACTS ON SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE,
EFFICIENT TRANSPORT, AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
A general discussion of considerations of safety, national defense,
efficient transport, and the national economy is given in the
following sections. It supplements specific discussions of these
considerations, where appropriate, given in the assessments of
individual projects.
Safety
In general, virtually all of the programs under consideration have
some future safety implications with respect to the need to maintain
or improve the present high levels of safety being achieved in
aeronautical operations. These implications arises from the unique
role of the government, which both develops aeronautical technologies
and certificates the integrity of aeronautical products to the
public. When NASA serves either as the developer of new or advanced
technologies or as the clearinghouse for aeronautical data, others,
such as manufacturers, universities, and government agencies, can then
contribute to the broad range of evaluations needed both to determine
the reliability and structural integrity of an advance and to consider
its potential for increased efficiencies. Equally important for civil
use, the FAA then has broad resources to draw Ripon in determining
*R6T Base.
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whether or within what limitations to certificate a product. A recent
example has been in the rapidly growing application of high-strength
fiber composite structures to all types of aircraft. The continuation
of NASA projects in this technology is essential to maintaining the
high standards of safety in air transportation that the public expects.
Conversely, when a single manufacturer makes an advance within a
proprietrry system, it must risk its reputation and future success on
the validity of its own findings, with no public evaluations or
additional checks. Similarly, the FAA must then accept or reject the
manufacturer's proposals on the basis of the same limited information.
Thus, all R&D with probable civil applications has important and
sometimes subtle implications for safety. Use of technology by public
carriers requires the highest standards of safety and careful
establishment of priorities.
National Defense
Historically, the interaction developed between NASA and the
Department of Defense has resulted in significant benefits to military
programs. While the defense establishment by virtue of its mission
concentrates on military-oriented programs, it makes use of technical
advice from NASA. On the other hand, there are areas of broad
aeronautical application in which NASA has a leading role and to which
the :►apartment of Defense has been able to contribute. A case in
point is NASA's clear lead in computational aerodynamics. Other
activities such as R&D facilities development and operation as well as
flight test techniques development are carried out in parallel on a
mutually supporting basis. Such complementary activities are of
definite benefit and importance to both organizations.
In the view of the panel, almost every Systems Technology program
of NASA is of significant, though not necessarily unique or
overriding, military interest. With regard to specific Systems
Technology programs, those on advanced composite materials and
structures, energy efficient engines, and advanced turboprop systems
are without doubt of great value toward advanced military systems of
the future--1)90 and beyond. Even though the defense establishment
has significant programs for advanced composite structures, the area
is so broad and so critical that the combined efforts of NASA and the
military are viewed a„ necessary to achieve early transition of such
important technology into effective and efficient systems for the
future.
In the case of the Energy Efficient Engine and the Advanced
Turboprop programs, the military establishment depends entirely on
NASA's work as there are no comparable activities within the Defense
Department. For large, long-endurance military aircraft of the
future, the defense establishment relies on NASA Systems Technology
programs.
61.--__
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Efficient Transport
U.S.-built airplanes have dominated the world'n airways since World
War II. They have been more productive, efficient, and reliable than
almost any other competing airplanes. American manufacturers have
maintained sales leadership with reasonable prices for superior
products, despite frequently more advantageous terms of acquisition
for airplanes built by foreign competitors.
The technical superiority of U.S. transport airplanes derives from
many factors, among which are the ability and ingenuity of the
airframe and engine designers, excellent postdelivery support of
products by the manufacturers, close cooperation between builders and
prospective users, the overall profitability of the business, and
basic research by NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics.
Air transportation has became a national enterprise, just like
rail transportation or mass transportation for cities. Air transport
has become almost the only means of overseas travel, and the major
means of travel for distances of more than 300 miles on the
continent. Airlift capability has become an important and integral
part of military strategy.
Much of the leadership by U.S. manufacturers can be traced to
early adoption of their products by U.S. airlines. These airplanes
have enabled the U.S. operators to establish positions of competitive
leadership and have forced foreign airlines to acquire the same type
vehicles. To date, most aircraft manufacturers in the foreign
countries with major airlines have not been able to produce a
competitive product--with the notable exception of the multinational
Airbus A-300. Thus, for many decades, advances in the efficiency,
comfort, convenience, and safety of the long-distance transportation
system have depended on technical progress in the U.S. aircraft
industry.
Since 1973, airline fuel efficiency, as measured in passenger seat
miles per gallon, hss increased 40 percent. Much of this economy has
resulted from retirement of older, less efficient airplanes, use of
airplanes with more seats, conservation, engine improvements, and some
aerodynamic improvements. More aerodynamic and propulsion
improvements and weight reductions through greater use of composites
will appear in new airplanes.
If American transport airplanes are to continue to serve American
transportation needs and are to retain a position of technical
leadership and superiority, they must continue to be more productive,
more efficient, and competitive in all respects and must meet the
requirements of the marketplace.
NASA programs such as the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACRE)
Program, which includes research in aerodynamics, propulsion,
composites, etc., are of prime importance to these ends. in fact,
some of the products of the ACRE program have already been
incorporated into airplanes and engines currently in operation.
NASA's research contributions have tlso assisted the FAA in
developing the microwave landing system, which has been adopted as an
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international standard. Such an application was not foreseen when the
Terminally Configured Vehicle Progam was initiated. It should
continue to be of help in the development of the National Airspace
System. Many contributions to operating safety have come from NASA
research, and much of this research is of a broad and integrated
nature and cannot normally be expected to come from industry.
National Economy
Although as indicated in Chapter 3, "Considerations Affecting the
Review," and in Chapter 5, "Bridging the Gap," many factors affect the
selection of civil sector R&D for government support, there is little
doubt that most of the NA!A programs reviewed have a potentially large
future impact on the national economy. This judgment can be made
without regard to the particular mechanisms that might be used to fund
them, although in many cases, because of dual military and civil
applicability, long-range high-risk payoff possibilities, and
industry-wide applicability over a wide range of aircraft tyres,
direct government support seems most appropriate and efficient.
The programs already discussed under "Efficient Transport," namely
the Aircraft Energy E'_ficienc:y (ACES) Program, which includes work in
aerodynamics, propulsion, and composites, and the Advanced Turboprop
program, typify NASA's efforts in support of maintaining the
technological, lead and international competitiveness of U.S. transport
aircraft, which programs subsidized by foreign gov_rnments are
currently challenging. The potential in these programs for improved
economic efficiency of U.S. transport aircraft will in itself
contribute to the national economy. An essential element of all of
these potential economic renefits is improved engine fuel consumption,
as exemplified by the Energy Efficient Engine Program. Large U.S. jet
engines currently dominate the world air transport market to an even
greater degree than in the past, since foreign aircraft such as the
Airbus use them. Maintaining this significant export potential also
benefits the economy.
Similar considerations apply to the general aviation area in both
aircraft and engines. Although the scale of general aviation R&D
generally involves smaller funding for individual projects and
although much of it tends to be done in the RiT Base rather than as
Systems Technology; it is important to maintain a healthy level of
work in thia area.
Bridging the Gap
The panel concurs with the OMB statement that government R&D support
should be focused "on fundamental research in all basic aeronautical
disciplines, the maintenance of specialized facilities for research
and testing, and technology development and demonstration activities
critical to the nation's needs . . . [while) technology development
and demonstration projects with relatively near-term commercial
applications will be curtailed as an inappropriate federal subsidy. 01
However, the interpretation of this principle in responding to the
question of whether it is necessary for the government to bridge tho
gap between research and early application of new technologies poses
many questions. In preceding chapters, the panel has attempted to
evaluate, using several criteria, whether certain technologies are
critical to national needs. A remaining question is how far on the
continuum of aeronautics research and development NASA appropriately
should go and at %fiat point industry or the Department of Defense
should be expected to assume validation and development
responsibilities for new technologies. The degree of technological
and financial risk involved and whether the expected technical and
financial payoff will occur in the long-term or the near-term are key
elements in making this determination in addition to national
criticality.
The gray area, which is under consideration in this review, is
mainly in the Systems Technolo5y area in projects characterized by
NASA as proof of concept or technology demonstration.2
Demonstration projects often have the appearance of prototype
development because the article being demonstrated must be capable of
lOffice of Management and Budget is Special Analysis K.
2NASA has defined the steps of the research and development
continuum as oeing (1) discipline research to understand basic
physical phenomena and generate concepts, (2) systems research tc,
understand the interaction between components, (?) praif-of-concept
activities to establish feasibility, (4) technology validation to
establish confidence, and (5) product development. M.SA never engages
in the latter activity and rarely in the technology validation stage.
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being tested in approximately the true operating environment. The
purposes of the demonstration are to establish the extent to which
design analyses and engineering laboratory tests are valid as bases
for projection of performance under operating conditions and to
identify any unforeseen factors that must be imposed on future designs
to reflect the requirements of the operating environment. The
demonstration article may not be (and often is not) sized as a
manufacturable and marketable product. Sometimes the demonstration is
based on testing new component• as operating elements of existing
operational systems.
Engine demonstration projects, for example, pose particular
difficulties for many critical observers of aeronautical R&D pr-grNas,
uecause a demonstration engine looks like a complete prototype enginft
and operates like one. Yet the demonstration engine is only intended
to determine the interactive performance of separately developed
components (fans, compressors, combustors, turbines). The
demonstration engine is usually not flight weight in all components,
nor does it have a flight-type fuel control system, starting
provisions, power takeoffs, compressed air bleeds, and other
appurtenances necessary for a flight engine. Moreover, the
demonstration engine does not meet flight safety and reliability
standardsr it is simply a bench test device. That the demonstration
engine is not really intended to be a prototype of an operational,
marketable engine is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that it may
be in a considerably different size class from the most obvious
specific applications (e.g., the military-sponsored General Electric
demonstration engir ►s that led to the TF-39 eventually installed in the
C-5A was sized at less than half the thrust level of the operational
engine). Thus, an engine demonstration project is clearly
distinguishable from a full-scale en.-mine engineering development
program.
Such demonstration projects are intended to build confidence in an
innovative design concept, structural arrangement, components, device,
or material in order to permit not only the potential manufacturer but
also thb user (military services, airlines, etc.) and the certifying
agency (FAA) to appraise the merits and anticipate the problems of the
innovation properly.
Clearly, if an innovation primarily for commetcial use is specific
in nature and proprietary to one manufacturer, the burden of
demonstration must be assumed by that manufacturer. But where a new
technology is intrinsically likely to be industry-wide, may have many
applications in many forms, has potential military and c;:vil
ap-'ications, is costly to demonstrate, ar.J has important implications
for safety and other regulatory concerns, then government funding may
be the most appropriate way to carry out the demonstration project.
The degree to which the stated criteria apply to any particular area
of innovation is inevitably a matter of judgment, but such
technological advances as the use of high-strength composite
structurea in aircra.t clearly have properly been undertaken with
government support of demonstration projects. The rate of progress in.
this area will continue to depend on the de-ree to which R&D is
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aggressively pursued, although the initial hurdles requiring
demonstration have undoubtedly been overcame for the level of
technology now being introduced in a number of now civil and military
aircraft--e.g., the Boeing 757/767 flight control surfaces and the
"Starrier" AV-8B Marine V/STOL fighter main wing structure. However,
new matrix materials, fibers, and structural arrangements and their
relationship to design, fabrication, inspection, and operating and
maintenance problems will continue to be tho subjects for R&D, and if
sufficiently large technological advances with high potential
performance and economic advantage seem to be in prospect at some
future time, a now round of demonstration projects would be in order.
The financial dimensions of introducing major innovations in large
transport aircraft may be perceived by considering that the cost of
launching such a program may be several billion dollars and the sums
required may well exceed the net worth of an aircraft manufacturer
("you bet your company" is one description of this situation).
Furthermore, concern over "risk taking in recent years has led to the
need for a greater degree of confider,	 a new technology before
financial interests are willing to bauk industry in the development of
a new product. Demonstration/proof-of-concept projects help to
determine when, in what areas of application, and with what technical
confidence aircraft manufacturers may be ready and willing to adopt
advanced technologies prior to proceeding with these large financial
undertakings. in addition, they help both government and industry to
identify areas of R&D where additional work may be necessary to reduce
technical risks before product development.
Thera is general agreement that the lead time for maturation of a
given technology should be a factor in determini : whether NASA should
appropriately be involved. Yet, as noted earlier, it is often
difficult to predict in what time frame a new development may occur.
As indicated in Chapter 3 in the section "Near Term Versus Long Term,"
aggressive pursuit of fiber composite technology in a joint
government-industry program resulted in the use of a boron fii:ir
composite horizontal tail surface on the F-14 aircraft in less than 10
years, and the recent NASA discovery of the winglet for drag reduction
has 'ound almost immediate possibilities for application in military
and civil aircraft.
The panel agrees that near-term commercial applications are the
responsibility of industry, but longer-term high-risk development and
demonstration, reflecting new, advanced concepts, are viewed as
essential to the nation's needs, are unlikely to be supported by
industry, and should be an issue for federal government concern.
These activities do not necessarily fill an identifiable need at the
present time, but seek to maintain a viable economic and defense
posture 10 or 20 years hence.
6Related Program Concerns
In the course of the panel's discussions, several issues arose, in
addition to the specific charges to the panel, regarding which the
members of the panel wish to record their concern.
LACK OF NEW INITIATIVES IN THE AERONAUTICS BUDGET
The panel views with great concern the deferral of NASA's new
initiatives in aeronautics for the past two years. New initiatives
tend to be revolutionary rather than evolutionary. Accordingly, most
industrial or commercial organizations cannot or will not risk
something that may fail completely or take 10 to 15 years to culminate
in a profitable product. This is where government laboratories have a
unique role to play. One of the most important functions for any
government laboratory is to study these new arias--at the basic
research level, at the applied research and exploratory development
level, and if necessary at the demonstration level.
Such areas as advanced composites research, new vehicle and engine
efficiency concepts, and advanced numerical techniques, which may
significantly affect the development and overall quality of new
aerospace systems, warrant vigorous pursuit if the United States is to
maintain a competitive posture in the coming decades. Because the
impact of such initiatives is negligible in the near term, it is easy
to continue to defer these activities. In the panel's view, the
decline and deferral of long-term R&D may result in severe setbacks in
the U.S. defense and economic posture near the turn of the century.
ADEQUACY AND BALANCE OF THE R&T BASE PROGRAM
A secondary and inadvertent effect of terminating Systems Technology
programs may be to redistribute research in the R&T Base away from
basic and long-rare research.
When a Systemb Technology program is terminated, some element of
it should often appropriately be transferred to the R&T Base; for
example, a typical $10 million program might contain within it as much
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as $1 or $2 million of fundamental work to support the specific
program. The panel observed that NASA has proposed to reprogram
approximately $11 million to the R&T Base to carry on fundamental work
and continue other parts of eliminated programs at reduced levels. In
the panel's review of the individual Systems Technology programs,
several programs appeared to be essentially groupings of individual
projects that properly belonged in the R&T Base. The panel has
recommended that these programs continue at some level in the R&T Base
as well.
It is not clear, however, whether current and planned growth of
the R&T Base is adequate to absorb these transfers from the canceled
programs, or whether such shifts will curtail or eliminate important
existing research programs in the R&T Base. This assumes that NASA
management will appropriately rebalance the R&T Base when funding
levels are determined.
In addition, the pressure on the NASA laboratories, under the
long-term trend of budget reductions in aeronautics programs combined
with the proposed sharp FY 1983 reductions, could result in NASA's
preserving in-house capabilities at the expense of programs conducted
out of house. Admittedly, if such pressures continue NASA will be
faced with losing its own cadre of experts, if not the absolute
capability of the organization. But budget reductions immediately
affect the health of university research, existing teams of experts
within the aeronautics industry, and the unique and successful
relationship that has existed among NASA, the universities, and
industry. Once abandoned, these arrangements will be difficult to
rebuild, if not irretrievably lost.
Figure 2 demonstrates this trend over a 10-year period. It shows
that in constant dollars support for research projects with industry
has declined by a factor of three and that university contracts have
fallen sonewhat over the past four years. In this regard, it is noted
that there have been some cancellations of approved multiyear basic
research programs at universities and projections that some current
long-term programs will not be continued in out years. This has
occurred durirg a period when the universities have been under
financial strain from the cancellation of other governr:^nt support and
from difficulties in raising funds. These reductions cdn adversely
affect the support of basic and applied engineering research at
universities and in industry and preclude the important contributions
these institutions can make. A reduction in the support for
engineering research at universities also weakens educational
opportunities for future engineers. The panel concludes from the
available data that, unless university, industry, and other contracts
are continued at a viable level, basic research will receive less
support in the proposed "expanded" R&T Base than in previous budgets.
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WASHINGTON. D-C- 20110
March 8, 1982
Mr. James M. Beggs
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
	
20546
Dear Mr. Beggs:
In accordance with the relationship between NASA and the National
Research Council (NRC) established by House Report 96-1476, we hereby
request a review of NASA's plans to significantly reduce its FY 1983
aeronautical research and technology programs.
Specifically, we request that the NRC Committee on NASA Program
Reviews ests:.lish a mechanism to examine the potential imoact of these
proposed changes. The review should identify those areas of key programs
no longer included in the FY 83 budget and: (1) address the national
criticality of those programs; (2) assess the risk associated with the
satisfactory completion of eAch of the programs-, and (3) determine the
degree to which these programs might be assumed by the private sector.
To assist in making a decision regarding this subject in a timely
fashion. a briefing on the findings of the review panel is requested by
July 16. 1982.
Sincerely,
dward P. and	
JH-I 
Chairman 
HUD-Independent Agenciesendent Agencies
Subcommittee	 ittee
House Appropriations	 Senate Appropriations
cc: Mr. Frank Press
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March 18, 1982
Mr. James M. Beggs
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C.
	
20546
Dear Mr. Beggs:
On the basis of staff discussion regarding clarification of the
second paragraph of our March 8 letter to you, the item which reads
"(2) assess the risk associated with satisfactory
completion of each of the programs; .."
can be re-phrased as
"(2) assess the risk (probability of success)
associated with achieving the objectives of each
of these programs; .."
Sincerely,
L.-J
tDpen'ICZ dent Agencies
Subcommittee
cc: Dr. Frank Press
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Appendix C
GUIDELINES FOR A REVIEW OF
REDUCTIONS IN NASA'S AERONAUTICS PROGRAM
The National Academy of Sciences/National Academy of Engineering
through the National Research Council contracted to furnish the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, through the NASA Chief
Engineer, a review of NASA Aeronautical Technology Program Reduc.ions
in response to Congressional request. This review is the second task
under a broader contractual arrangement with NASA to provide Congress
with NRC evaluations of major NASA program changes. The request
issued by letter dated March 8, 1982, from Senator Garn and
Congressman Boland to NASA Administrator James Beggs with further
explanatory note of March 18, 1982, frc.m Senator Garn stated the
charge:
in accordance with the relationship between NASA and the
National Research Council established by house Report 96-1476, we
hereby request a review of NASA's plans to significantly reduce
its FY 83 aeronautical research and technology programs.
Specifically, we request that the NRC Committee on NASA
program Reviews er'.ablish s mechanism
	
examine the potential
impact of these proposed changes. The review should identify
those areas of key programs no longer included in the FY 83 budget
and: (1) address the national criticality of theses programst (2)
assess the risk associated with satisfactory completion of each of
the programs (i.e., assess the risk (probability of success)
associated with achieving the objectives of each of these
programs)t and (3) determine the degree to which these programs
might be assumed by the private sector.
To assist in making a decision regarding this subject in a
timely fashion; a briefing on the findings of the review panel is
requested by July 16, 1982.
To deal with the request for carrying out reviews of NASA
programs, the NRC established the Committee on NASA Program Reviews.
In order to address diverse problems, the committee has been
authorised to establish ad hoc review panels, of which this--the panel
to review reductions in the NASA Aeronautics Program--is the second.
In carrying out this review, account should be taken of recent
studies related to NASA's aeronautics .rogam conducted by the NRC
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Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, which include "NASA's Role in
Aeronautics: A Workshop" (7 volumes), "NASA's Aeronautics Research
and Technology Base," and "NASA's Aeronautics Program: Systems
Technology and Experimental Programs." The work of the NRC panel
conducting a Review of Aovanced Technology Competition and the
Industrialised Allies should be tAken into consideration as well.
The review panel is to consider the NASA Aeronautics Research and
Technology Program as a whole to include the Research and Technology
Ease, the Systems Technology generic fields, their individual projects
and proposed new initiatives from their level of effort in FY 61 or
earlier to date. Four areaa deemed to be of primary importance with
regard to aeronautical systems are:
Safety
National Defense
Efficient Transport
National Economy
The panel shall address the following questions:
1) Is it necessary for the government to bridge the gap between,
the Aeronauti Research and Technology Base and early
application wish regard to the four areas noted above?
2) What is the outlook for success and what are the time horizons
of those projects excluded from the proposed FY 83 budget?
Would ;ndustry undertake these projects (now or later) if
government does not do them and on what basis?
3) If neither government nor industry undertakes the projects
noted in question 2), what will be the impact with regard to
the four areas noted above?
4) What should be the priorities within NASA's Aeronautics
Research and Technology Program?
It is understood that NASA will provide information and data on
the following: scientific and technical objectives of their
aeronautics research and technology programs, their funding levels by
project from FY 81 or earlier to those proposed for FY 83, and
detailed descriptions of the Aeronautics System Technology projects
(as well as proposed new initiatives) to include, for those projects
to be terminated, their anticipated status at the time of termination.
It is requested that the task be completed and the report be
forwarded to the Committee on NASA Program Reviews by June 30, 1982.
Committee on NASA Program Reviews
Washington, D.C.
March 27, 1982
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Appendix D	 OF POOR QUALITY
EXCERPTS FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET'S
SPECIAL ANALYSIS K
SPECIAL ANALYSIS K
RESEARCH AND DEVELOP111EN'T
This analysis summarizes the funding of research and develop-
ment across all departments and agencies. It consists of two parts.
The first highlights the R. & D. policies and trends in the 1983
budget. The second describes in more detail the R. & D. programs
of the 13 agencies whose 1983 obligations account for over 99% of
total Federal funding for R. & D.
.The Federal Government does not have a separate R. & D.
budget. Rather, R. & D. programs are reviewed and funded primar-
ily in the context of the missions of individual agencies and on the
basis of their importance in meeting mission objectives.
Parr I. HIGHLIGHTS
R. & D. activities are supported by the Federal Government in
two broad categories, namely, to meet:
• Federal Government needs—wnere the Pole or primary user
of the R. & D. is the Government itself, for example, in
national defense and environmental regulation.
• National needs—where the Federal Government helps to
assure the strength of the Nation's economy and the welfare
of its citizens through the support of R. & D. in specific areas
such as agriculture, energy, and health.
The 1983 budget reflects a clearer delineation, than has been the
case in the past, between the responsibilities of the Federal Gov-
ernment and those of the private sector with respect to R. & D. to
help meet national needs.
The Federal Government has two main responsibilities with re-
spect to R. & D. to meet national needs.
• First, it should provide a climate for technological innovation
which encourages private sector R. & D. investment that best
reflects the realities of the marketplace where new and im-
proved processes and products are developed, bought, and
sold. The administration is fulfilling this respor-sibility pri-
marily by reduc i ng Government spending, regulation and
taxes. Thus, the administration's R. & D. polio is part of its
overall economic policy.
• Second, the Government should focus its direct R. & D. sup-
port on those areas where there is .,ubstantial prospect for
significant economic gain to the Nation, but where the pri-
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vate sector is unlikely to invest adequately in the national
interest because the benefits, in large measure, are not imme-
diately "appropriable" by individual firms. Thus, for example,
the Federal Government supports basic research across all
scientific disciplines but limits its spending on technology
development to technologies requiring a long period of initial
'development, such as fusion power, where the risk is high but
the payoff to the Nation is potentially large. This strategy is
reflected in the funding for R. & D. to meet national needs in
the 1983 budget.... .
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (.NASA).--Ob-
ligations for the conduct of R. & D. by NASA are estimated at
$6.5 billion for 1983. $0.7 billion over 1982. Increased funding
for 1983 is proposed to assure timely transition of the Space
Shuttle to an operational system stnd to continue the highest
priority research and space exploration projects. including the
further development of tae Space Telescope, Gamma -Ray Ob-
servatory and the Galileo Mission to Jupiter......
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Through th, programs of NASA, the Federal G ^rnment makes
itivestments in R. & D. that yield new space te( -iologies to im.
prove the national security and the long-term sci ;fic and techno.
logics: strength of the Nation. They also prov..e new knowledge
about the earth, the solar system, and the universe.
In 1983, the R. & D. request would continue flight missions
Launched in prior years (e.g., Voyagers to the outer planets) and
further development of most major ongoing projects, including the
Space Shuttle. Obligations for the conduct of R. & D. would in-
crease by $672 million in 1983 to a total of $6.5 billion. Within this
amount, basic research would amount to .$582 million, an increase
of $102 million over 19F2. Obligations for construction of facilities
in 1983 would total $116 million. - . - .
Aeronautical Research and Technology Programs.—In 1983,
support will be focused on fundamental research in all basic
aeronautical disciplines, the maintenance of specialized facilities
for research and testing, and technology development and demon-
stration activities cr._ical to the Nation 's defense needs.
Research emphasis will be placed on:
• Aerodynamics, propulsion and avionics;
• Flight controls and human -vehicle interaction; and
• Materials and structures.
Technology development and demonstration projects with rela-
tively near term commercial applications will be curtailed as an
inappropriate Federal subsidy.... .
Appendix E
NASA OFFICE OF AERONAUTICS AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
BRIEFING PERSONNEL
DR. JACK L. KERREBROCK, Associate Administrator
DR. RAYMOND S. COLLADAY, Deputy Associate Administrator
MR. C. ROBERT NYSMITH, Assistant Associate Administrator for Management
MR. WILLIAM P. PETERSON, Director, Resources and Management Division
MR. FREDERICK P. POVINELLI, Director, Institutional and Program Support
Division
DR. LEONARD A. HARRIS, Director, Aerospace Research Division
DR. CECIL C. ROSEN, III, Deputy Director, Aerospace Research Division
MR. ROGER L. WINBLADE, Manager, Subsonic Office
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REPRESENTATIVES FROM ORGANIZATIONS
WHO MADE PRESENTATIONS TO THE PANEL
MS. VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Director, Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace
Industries Association
MR. ALLEN SKAGGS, Vice President Civil Aviation, Aerospace Research
Center, Aerospace Industries Association
MR. JO—SE-PH SNODGRASS, Director of Aviation Prc3rams, Aerospace Research
Canter, Aerospace Industries Association
MR.. JEFF STRUTHERS, Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Office of
Management and Budget
DR. LOUIS MONTULLI, Study Director, Office of Science and Zschnology
Policy
MR. JAMES	 `ZrlWLEY, `,tic? Pt =3ident GovernmE- t Relations, Ger^ral
Aviation Manufacturers Association
MR. STANLEY GREEN, Vice President and General Counsel, General Aviation
Manufacturers Association
MR. SIEGBERT B. PORITZRY, Director of Systems Engineering Management,
Federal Aviation Administration
MR. RAYMOND SIEWERT, Director of Engineering Technology, Department of
Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and
Engineering
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Appendix G
THE ROLE OF NASA SYSTEMS STUDIES
System studies are an essential element of any engineering or applied
science program. The more complex the end products to which the R&D
is to be applied and the more advanced the technology involved, the
more important the system studies. Modern air transports and military
aircraft are both highly complex and involve much advanced
technology. Aeronautical R&D, therefore, requires support by
extensive system studies. Only by examining a wide range of potential
applications of emerging technology can proper emphasis be placed on
the various specific areas included in all phases of the R&D process.
In many cases, system studies also provide guidance on the specific
problems that must be addressed.
System studies of aircraft usually comprise integrated designs of
potential future aircraft systems incorporating new technologies as
they are projected to be available at some future time. These study
designs may cover a range of technological and end-use parameters and
superficially appear to be what an industry design team normally does
to design an end product. However, the system study designs are
generally limited in detail but of broader scope in ranges of
applications and technological variables. NASA's role in sponsoring
these studies is to bring in the results of their own technology base
programs in establishing the scope and direction of the studies and to
integrate and evaluate the results of several industry design teams in
the airframe, engine, and possibly equipment areas, as appropriate to
the particular potential development under study. NASA also brings in
the concerns of users (e.g., airlines) and government agencies such as
FAA and seeks to arrive at overall assessments as to the potential
value and timing of new technologies in various applications and the
R&D needed to achieve potential advances. The specific system designs
analyzed in this process are generic and are not likely to represent,
even approximately, specific products to be manufactured and marketed
by industry at some future time.
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JOINT INDUSTRY R&D PROGRAMS
In considering whether it would be possible for the aircraft engine
industry to fund demonstration R&D programs, it should be noted that
the major large engine manufacturers presently are investing $100-$200
million annually in engineering development of commercial engines for
the near term. Demonstration engine programs for transport or
military applications currently involve costs of about $100 million,
while the total cost of developing a new transport (or military)
engine may come to a billion dollars. Funding for a typical
demonstration engine project has run at an average of $25 million
annually over four years. Clearly, investments on the nearer-term
projects involve much less risk in troth the technical and commercial
aspects and earlier (and hence financially more attractive) payoffs.
This factor tends to mitigate against industry investments in
longer-term, more uncertain, future developments.
However, there are, in principle, many ways in which industry
could pool its efforts in conducting research and development programs
of industry-wide interest. Recently, the integrated circuit industry
and the computer industry in the United States undertook joint
sponsorship of university programs and other programs as part of their
efforts to counter foreign-government-subsidized programs. In the
areas of electric utilities and industrial abrasives, there is a
history of industry associations that conduct R&D.
The antitrust laws and regulations are often cited as obstacles to
such activities. However, the legal complexities are such that it is
difficult to determine in advance what is and what is not
permissible. Moreover, the government's antitrust policies have
changed over the years and will probably continue to evolve. In
general, recent Justice Department documents indicate cooperative
industry R&D is more likely to be acceptable under existing antitrust
policies if it is directed toward basic or fundamental research,
becoming less acceptable as the development end of the R&D spectrum is
approached. As noted, however, the characterization of the various
stages of the R&D process is subject to wide ranges of interpretation,
and it is difficult to conjecture how specific proposals might be
judged.
Aside from the legal aspects of the problem, the structure of
given industries and the competitive environment both at home and
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abroad influence the attitudes of those industries toward cooperative
R&D and determine the kinds of arrangements that are desirable and
feap ib:e. An example of a situation posing special competitive and
antit.ust considerations is the jet engine industry, in which there
are only two U.S. producers of large jet engines for transports and
military rircraft (General Blectric and Pratt i Whitney). The panel
did not pursue the potential for cooperative industrial research in
depth but found some reservation on the part of both the aircraft and
engine industry representatives with whom the matter was discussed.
The general aviation manufacturers' representatives, however, seemed
less inclined to rule out the possibility of cooperative R&D in some
areas.
Since the establishment of workable and legally permissible
mechanisms and organizations for conducting cooperative R&D would
undoubtedly take several years to achieve acceptance and operational
effectiveness, the panel did not consider cooperative R&D as a
feasible near-term alternative to government funding for most of the
programs in the FY 1983 budget.
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